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Under the idea/expression dichotomy, the protection of copyright extends only to an artist‟s original expression and it 
does not protect the ideas that are being expressed. Lord Hoffmann‟s decision in Designers Guild v Russel Williams 
(Textiles) Ltd has clearly interpreted that the idea that is only in the head that has been unexpressed in a copyrightable form 
is not entitled to copyright. Nevertheless, a problem may arise when the idea and its expression are difficult to be separated 
and they are considered to have merged or called as scenes a faire. As a result, this merger doctrine has caused the 
expression not copyrightable. In the UK, this merger doctrine can be seen from the House of Lord‟s decision in LB Plastics 
v Swish and Hanfstaengl v Baines. 
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The issues of copyrights have always attracted hot 
social contention in the United Kingdom (hereinafter 
the UK).
1 
There is no a clear distinction between an 
idea and its expression in the United Kingdom‟s 
copyright law.
2
 As well as it is blurred in the statute or 
in case law.
3
 It can be seen from the judge decisions 
regarding copyright infringement are not coherent in 
interpreting whether or not the defendant has 
infringed copyright law due to taking another author 
work's idea. The principle stating that an idea could 
not be protected, but its expression is entitled to 
copyright is one of the fundamental copyrights not 
expressed in the Copyright, Design and Patent Act 
(hereinafter CDPA) 1988. Although, Section 3(2) of 
the CDPA concerning fixation of a work provides that 
literary, dramatic and musical work have to be 
recorded (or fixed) in a tangible form in order to get 
copyright protection and Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Rights, 1994 which provides 
that copyright shall extend to expressions and not to 
ideas.
4
 These are not sufficient to form a similar 
interpretation of the Judge's perception in relation to 
making a distinction between ideas and its expression 
which enable to distinguish between the public and 
the private elements of a work.
5 
There is a problem that might arise that in case the 
idea and its expression are difficult to be separated 
and they are considered to have merged or known as 
scenes a faire. The merger doctrine relates closely to 
the Idea-Expression Dichotomy. The merger doctrine 
defines that idea is inseparable with its expression 
resulting in it is not possible to be expressed 
differently to the same idea causing such expression 
has no copyright protection.
6
 The merger doctrine 
forms an exception to idea and it is an exception 
doctrine. Rather than look into the UK case laws 
regardingthe ideas and its expression dichotomy in the 
UK copyright law comprehensively, Arnold has 
looked into the history of the UK‟s copyright law 
regime.
6
 In addition, Pocock has discussed the 
originality of copyright in Europe.
7
 Moreover, Pila 
has examined the categories definition of original 
works in the UK.
6 
Thus, it is important to discuss how 
the case laws in the UK applied in terms of solving 
the vagueness of the ideas and its expression 
dichotomy in the state‟s copyright law. 
 
 
The Idea and Expression Dichotomy in Artistic 
Works 
In Donoghue v Allied Newspaper Ltd, Farewell J. 
decides that it is clear that copyright does not exist in 
an idea or ideas.
6 
An individual might have a smart 
idea for a tale, an image, a play which is considered it 
is original by him. However, if he informs that idea to 
an author, an artist or a playwright producing a work 
from this idea‟s communication, the copyright of the 
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work belongs to the artist, the author or the 
playwright who has clothed the idea in form and the 
person who owns the idea has no right in such work.
6 
It shows that there is a dichotomy between an idea 
and expression in the copyright law. Copyright might 
exist in an artistic work; for instance, in the work 
existing spatially anddeemed on visual and tactile 
media which has a form of the relationship totality in 
space (either two or three dimensional) that is defined 
by the points and lines, either actual or notional 
constituting it shapes or configurations and the 
juxtaposition and colour arrangement, textures and 
solidity making up the work as a whole.
6
 
It has been claimed that there are no bright lines 
distinguishing between the protected and the 
unprotected.
8 
The idea and expression dichotomy 
offer vague guidance in determining what is an idea 
as opposing to expression.
 9 
In determining whether or 
not the copyright infringement has occurred, lawyers 
have to argue with two vague doctrines: the doctrines 
claiming that there is no a copyright infringement 
unless the whole or a substantial part of the work is 




The principle that copyright does not protect an 
idea but only protects its expression.
11
 It could be 
explained by imagining a piece of a written story.
12 
The literal for artistic works are the precise usage of 
lines, textures and colours.
13 
The story-line originates 
in the author‟s idea; it is the particular words used 
which are the expression the author has adopted and 
everyone is allowed to write a story based on the 
same lines; however, he/she is prohibited to copy the 
particularly chosen words by the first author.
6
 Thus, 
the basic idea of a story is not protected by copyright 
but copyright only protects the words expressed in the 
story.
14
 Additionally, it is consistent with the 
definition provided that originality in the form of the 
expression of the author's own intellectual creation.
14 
It is clear that it requires the first author to fix the 
work before copyright exists in order to present a 
particular form of expression.
15 
The positive thing of 
giving protection only to the expression of ideas is 
would provide the opportunity to third parties to make 
whatever use they wish of the ideas contained in a 
copyrightable work.
16
 Therefore, the ideas or concepts 
behind a painting, a book, or a computer program 
taken or included them into their own works would be 
not an infringement.
14
 The dichotomy infers that 
copyright mostly protects the expression of an idea 
that is created by an author rather than the ideas, such 
dichotomy would be misconceived.
5 
Criticism regarding such dichotomy is generally 
two-pronged. Firstly, it is sometimes postulated that 
the lack of certainty in statutory provisions 
concerning idea and its expression dichotomy in 
consecutive UK copyright statues makes serious 
doubt on its legitimacy.
5
 It results from a literal 
interpretation of the Berne Convention, which does 
not state clearly in terms of excluding ideas from 
copyright protection, and various international 
instruments and some municipal laws definitely 
recognizing this dichotomy as an inseparable 
principle of copyright law generally dismiss it.
17
 
Secondly, a stronger dispute developed by critics of 
the idea-expression dichotomy is that it is not an 
effective tool for overcoming copyright dispute.
18
 
There is the central truth in this persuasive opinion 
and it is generally supported by the absence of the 
dichotomy and its ad hoc usage in most copyright 
infringement cases.
18
 Therefore, it could be deduced 
that despite the fact that courts adduce the dichotomy 
purposively, the task distinguishing ideas from 
expressions of ideas is likely to be a pointless 
approach unless the copyright law provisions 
regulating the unfair competition are considerable 
overtaken.
18 
In the Newspaper Licensing Agency case, Lord 
Hoffmann explained that: 
“copyright infringement is sufficiently flexible to 
conclude the copying of ideas abstracted from a 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, 
provided that their expression in the original work 
has involved sufficient of the relevant original skill 
and labor to attract copyright protection".
18
 
It is clear that although such distinction seems easy 
in application, the dichotomy has caused 
unsatisfactory due to the fact that instead of copying 
the expressed words of a story.
18
 The detailed plot, 
scenes, incidents, characters, and sequence of events 
might be taken and the new story would have very 
few literal similarities.
17
 Thus, although it is worth 
accepting the rule of distinction between the idea and 
its expression, it has been argued that it would be very 
difficult to make a distinction between the idea and  
its expression.
19
 Copyright law had to consider 
protecting the non-literal parts of a work existing 
between the basic idea and the printed words  
forming the story, if not it would circumvent 
copyright law by altering the actual words used but 








In LB Plastics v Swish, the House of Lord‟s 
decision seems that an idea and its expression were 
inseparable because although the defendant did not 
copy the expression of the plaintiff‟s work which was 
entitled to copyright drawing, the defendant was held 
liable for infringing copyright law.
20
 The House of 
Lords stated that although an idea is not entitled to 
copyright law, on the facts, the defendant had copied 
details of expression.
19
 Lord Wilberforce stated thata 
mere idea is not entitled to copyright; hence all the 
defendant had done to take from the appellants the 
idea of external latching, or the unhanding of 
components or any other idea embedded in their 
work, the appellants are not allowed to complaint.
21
 In 
addition, in Hanfstaengl v Baines, Lord Watson stated 
that the artist‟s design and the idea that gives birth to 
the design, which is so new and exceptional, make it 
difficult for another artist to create some idea without 
trenching upon the design.
2 
Thus, the aforementioned 
cases above has made clear that ideas and their 
expressions are inseparable or called as the merger 
doctrine resulting in an exception to idea and an 
exception to doctrine.  
It is clear that the vague distinction between an 
idea and its expression has to be considered by the 
courts to determine the boundaries of copyright 
protection in order to anticipate the vacuum of law 
that could cause unfair competition.
2 
Therefore, the 
doctrine that copyright does not protect an idea would 
not be absolute.
22
 In terms of the defendant copied the 
plaintiff's idea, the Court would play an important role 
in determining the infringement by assessing the 
sweat of the brow of the plaintiff's work that allegedly 
has been taken by the defendant.
23
 
In Corelli v Gray, the defendant created a sketch 
named „The People‟s King‟ performed at various 
theatres.
2
 The complainant had written a novel titled 
„Temporal Power‟ and claimed that the defendant‟s 
work was copied from hers and infringed her 
copyright.
24
 The first instance judge agreed with the 
plaintiff and granted an injunction.
25
 The judge 
considered that the total amount of likenesses 
involving resemblances to the plot between  
their works forced the judge to conclude that the 
defendant had copied the plaintiff's work.
19
 In the 
Court of Appeal, Cozens-Hardy MR stated that a 
significant change had been made in the law by the 
Act of 1911.
19
 According to the former law, it is not 
the copyright infringement if a person who wanted to 
dramatize a novel, unless there was evidence that he 
had to a material extent copied the actual words of the 
copyrighted work, hence, although it was limited to 
such circumstance, the person was given a free hand 
by the law to use any combination of incidents.
19
 It is 
inconsistent with Sections 1 to 8 of the CDPA 
providing that if a work does not fall within one of the 
eight categories stated in the CDPA (literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic works, sound 
recordings, films, broadcasts and typographical 
arrangements of published editions) it cannot be 
protected, although it is a genuine expression.
19
 In 
addition, Article 5of the 2001 Copyright Directive 
also provides that only the expression right of the 
author is deserved to be protected.
19
 Moreover, the 
copyrighting of literary works were regulated in 
Section 1 of the Copyright Act, 1911, and sub-Section 2 
worded that “For the purposes of this Act, „copyright‟ 
means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work 
or any substantial part thereof in any material form 
whatsoever, to perform…the work or any substantial 
part thereof in public;…and shall include the sole 
right…(c) in the case of a novel or other non-dramatic 
work…to convert it into a dramatic work…”.
26
 Such 
an entirely new or an enlarged right was deserved to 
be termed a new right.
27
 The learned Judge rendered 
the fact presented by the plaintiff that it was 
impossible not to believe that the defendant had 
composed the sketch with the plaintiff‟s book in front 
of the defendant‟s eyes or in his memory.
19
 
A clear and exhaustive judgment of the learned 
Judge was based on consideration of six incidents 
found both in the sketch and also in "Temporal 
Power", and the Judge stated that the incidents were 
not only found in both works but also there were 
remarkable similarities or identities of language 
between the two works.
19
After analyzing the fact, the 
learned Judge had stated that there was nothing very 
interesting or original in both works, the similarities 
and coincidences in this case, when taken in 
combination, would be entire could not be understood 
because of only chance coincidence.
19
 Due to the fact 
that the defendant might have the plaintiff's book 
either under his eyes or in his mind when he was 
writing his sketch, there is no doubt that the defendant 
had not infringed the copyright because he had only 
taken from the book that did not amount to 
copyright.
19
 Nevertheless, the incidents used by the 
defendant appeared not mere one, two or three but a 




combination of stock incidents that each incident had 
been taken from the plaintiff‟s book, “it would be 
narrowing the law beyond what was reasonable to say 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to be protected”.
19
 
His Lordship considered that despite the fact that a 
combination consisting of a series of incidents taken 
by the defendant in his sketch had not been found any 
one sentence of printed words used by the plaintiff‟s 
book, the plaintiff was entitled to be granted an 
injunction.
19
 Consequently, the new Act was not only 
to protect the printed words in a novel but also to 
protect the contained situation in it.
19
 His Lordship 
considered that it was sufficient to justify a decision 
that the case fell within Section 1 of the Act due to the 
fact that “in a sketch of six scenes there were five 
scenes which were also in the plaintiff‟s book and 
were not found in any other book”.
19
 
In the case of Anacon Corporation Ltd v 
Environmental Research Technology Ltd, Laddie J 
stated that in terms of a literary work, copyright does 
not only protect the words used, but also it might give 
protection to the themes and ideas incorporated into 
the work if they are adequately substantial.
19
 “What 
the copyright protects is the relevant work and skill 
embodied in the work”.
19 
The CDPA 1998 prevents 
the work from being reproduced in any material 
form.
28
 Thus, a two-dimensional artistic work might 
be infringed by reproducing it in three dimensions 
because the latter work is derived from using 
substantial skill and effort of the former author in 
creating the original work.
28 
In British Northrop Ltd v Texteam Blackburn Ltd, 
Megarry J. concluded that original ideas are not the 
concern of the copyright law, but it concerns with 
their expression forms and in such expression must 
exist original ideas.
29 
The expression should not be in 
original or novel form; however, it must be original 
with the author and not be copied from another work. 
Thus, a drawing, which is simply traced, from another 
drawing, is not a novel artistic work. 
In Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd, 
Buckley L.J. decided that in artistic work, copyright 
law protects the skill and labour devoted to producing 
it; hence, not the skill and labour devoted to making 
some idea or invention conveyed by the artistic 
work.
30 
Buckley L.J. stressed that copyright protection 
in artistic work is not for the work that lays a novel or 
new idea which is representing a commonplace object 
or theme.
28
 it can be understood that there is a 
dichotomy of idea and expression. Despite the fact 
that the idea is novel and it is transformed into a 
certain form of artistic work, the work is not going to 
be protected as it still represents a commonplace 
objects or theme in its artistic work form.  
It would be difficult to determine the distinction 
between protected expression and unprotected ideas, 
but it is an essential important doctrine.
28
 Thus, in 
terms of literary and dramatic works, it could be 
deduced that copyright law does not only protect the 
literal aspect of the work, but also might protect the 
nonliteral elements of a novel or play such as the plot, 
the storyline, and the incidents and themes.
31
 
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom has not really 
addressed the issue; it is less likely that the United 
Kingdom‟s copyright law will protect characters of a 
novel or play.
32
 Moreover, it would be more difficult 
to deal with the case of the computer programs where 
protection has been wider, both in the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, to non-
literal elements of programs, for example, their 
structure, menu systems, interfaces, screen displays, 
and such like.
32 
However, in Designer Guild Ltd v Russell Williams 
(Textiles) Ltd, the Court had different points of view 
on this issue. The claimant had created its fabric 
design called Ixia, in 1994 and made it available in 
shops from September 1995.
31
 The design was 
expressed with the general feature, made up of 
roughly drawn pink and yellow stripes with flowers 
with the different directions that have no particular 
order across them. One year after selling it in shops, 
the claimant found that the defendant was trading the 
similar design to the claimant‟s design called 
Marguerite.
33 
The defendant stated that although there 
were similarities between both fabric designs, there 
were also several differences between the two designs 
because the defendant had developed it from her own 
Cherry Blossom design.
33
 The Court of Appeal held 
that based on the similarities between two designs, the 
defendant had copied either the idea embodied or the 
same techniques producing a similar visual effect in 
the plaintiff‟s work.
33 
Regarding whether or not a 
substantial part had been copied, the Court of Appeal 
held that “the combination of the flowers and the 
stripes, the way in which they related to each other, 
the way in which they were painted and the way in 
which there was a resist effect which made the overall 
combination amount to the copying of the substantial 
part”.
33
 The defendant before the Court of Appeal 
admitted that he might have had copied the plaintiff‟s 




work but he neither copied the whole nor a substantial 
part of the work, and the defendant also argued that 
according to the law the similarities appearing 
between the works were not adequate to claim that the 
defendant had taken the substantial part of the 
plaintiff‟s work.
34 
Morrit L.J. agreed with the 
defendant argument by stating that after comparing 
the two designs, it seemed that there was no 
involvement of the copying of a substantial part of the 
plaintiff‟s design in the defendant‟s design, “they just 
do not look sufficiently similar”.
34
 
On the other hand, the House of Lords allowed the 
defendant to appeal the decision of the Court of 
Appeal and held that the defendant did not infringe 
the copyright in the plaintiff‟s artistic work.
34
 The 
House of Lords stated that the principle should be 
considered carefully due to the fact that the idea-
expression dichotomy could be more than a work that 
has been expressed in a fixed form.
35
 Lord Hoffmann 
made two distinction propositions regarding such 
principle; firstly, certain ideas expressed by a 
copyright work might not be protected because they 
are not related to the literary, dramatic, or musical 
work.
34
 Lord Hoffmann said that it would be a matter 
in terms of a literary work that described a system or 
invention.
24
 Albeit the work would get protection, 
copyright would not grant the author to claim 
protection for their system or invention mentioned.
24
 
Lord Hoffman considered that the sole purpose of the 
idea and its expression is not to determine copyright 
fixation when copyright subsistence is established, but 
a court must contemplate whether idea or its 
expression were copied from the infringed work.
17
 In 
Kleeneze Ltd v DRG, Lord Hoffmann explained that 
Whitford J held that there had been no copyright 
infringement in the "claimant's drawing of a letterbox 
draught-excluder, where the defendant had merely 
taken the concept of the draught-excluder".
17
 
Secondly, even though such ideas are derived from 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic nature, they 
might not get protection due to the fact that such ideas 
lack originality or so commonplace which are not able 
to form a substantial part of the work.
36
 Regarding the 
second proposition, Lord Hoffmann exemplified 
Kenrick v Lawrencecase.
17
 The case described that 
copyright existed in the drawing of a hand; however, 
the granted copyright would prevent the copyright 
owner from objecting to other people to draw hands, 
if it happens, all that was reproduced was the idea.
24
In 
addition, Lord Hoffmann explained that "at that level 
of abstraction, the idea, though expressed in the 
design, would not have represented sufficient of the 




Therefore, in Designer Guild Ltd v Russel William 
(Textiles), Lord Hoffmann stated that the idea to 
combine stripes with flowers in a fabric design fell 
within the second proposition.
17 
Such interpretation 
directly does not make a distinction between 
idea/expression with originality. The mere indicator 
used is commonplace interpreted as the minimum 
level of requirement to constitute the work at all, or 
protected level of skill, labor, and judgment. Lord 
Hoffmann's explanation regarding the rule that ideas 
are not entitled to be protected is useful in recognising 
the uncertainty of the concept of the idea causing 
misinterpretation of the nature and scope of the 
exclusion despite the fact that the exclusion is a fairly 
large degree narrow one, and does not include all that 
might be interpreted as an idea.
17
 On the other hand, 
the approach used by Lord Hoffmann to fix the rule 
that there would be no an infringement of copyright in 
terms of copying the ideas causing the criticism 
lacking clarity is incomplete.
24
 The approach 
collapsing the rule on the non-protection of ideas into 
a rule on originality, rather than acknowledging its 
basis in public policy might produce an unduly 
limited account of the exception.
37
 Lord Hoffmann 
views that each element of an artistic work with the 
exemption it got there by accident or compulsionis the 
expression of the idea of the author.
37
 Excluding the 
ideas from being protected by copyright law would be 
an important judicial approach that is adduced to 
reconcile the different interests of copyright holders 
with those of users, creators, and the public more 
generally.
22
 Consequently, such interests would not 
prevent the public interest from making new works 
dealing with the same topic, or subject matter, being 
undermine because of using free functional ideas 
(other than those protected by design), using the same 
technique of production (it is limited by patent law), 
expressing the expression, disseminating political and 
economic ideas and historical facts.
37
 Furthermore, 
the principle of non-protection of ideas would avoid 
monopoly practices blocking culture, communication, 
innovation, creativity, and expression.
37
 On the other 
hand, such uncertain parameters of transformative 
uses and inconsistent application of the 
idea/expression dichotomy would hesitate users to 
exploit or transform the great corpus of cultural 






 This phenomenon might have violated the 
knowledge principle, which optimizing the access to 
knowledge resources aiming at learning and education 
in order to create new work.
38
 It would have been 
better if theauthors granted derivative work rights 
which is not only protecting their expressions from 
reproducing but also preventingothers from creating 
the same idea in the same ways.
39
 
In Designer Guild Ltd v Russel William (Textiles), 
Lord Millet stated that the Court of Appeal 
“misunderstood the function of a visual comparison of 
the two works in a case concerned with artistic 
copyright and the stage at which such a comparison 
should be undertaken”.
40
 Lord Millett used the second 
proposition by separating the resemblances between 
the issue of copying and substantiality, dismissing 
those consisting of commonplace, unoriginal or 
general ideas.
41
 Due to the fact that there is no 
certainty regarding originality, substantial part, and 
idea/expression, it is important to make interpretation 
the hidden functions and justifications for copyright 
because they influence the court‟s decision, hence, it 
could be no surprise, the unpredictable rule could 
allow the potential variety of influences.
24
 In addition, 
in terms of in an era affected by the growth of 
international rule-setting in the meaning of the rights 
of the copyright owners, the non-protection ideas 
would be one of the few options allowing the courts 
to take account of the individual circumstances and 
merits of particular conclusions.
42
 It would be better 
to accept the interpretation presented by Lord 
Hoffmann in terms of restricting the idea/expression 
dichotomy in order to decide that the similarities 
derived from commonplace could not cause an 
allegation of copying, rather than to challenge 
whether copyright exists at all.
42
 
The most important issue of the scope of copyright 
protection regarding the ideas-expression dichotomy 
in the Designer Guild case raised by Lord Hoffmann 
is that it seems that Lord Hoffmann has applied the 
idea/expression dichotomy as an aspect of the 
considerable inquiry.
24
 He believed that “the more 
abstract and simple the copied idea,the less likely it is 
to constitute a substantial part”.
43
 According to Lord 
Hoffmann‟s suggestion, it could be taken of shorthand 
for two quite different and important claims.
43
 Firstly, 
it would be possible to determine any aspect of a 
work alternatively as an idea or as expression, 
however, not everything that could be classified as an 
idea because of the purposes of the idea-expression 
dichotomy.
43
 According to Lord Hailsham of St 
Marylebone stated that “it all depends upon what you 
mean by ideas”.
43
 Ideas that are of adequate 
particularity that might be considered as to be the 
work; the contribution; sometimes considered not as 
ideas but as expression. As Lord Hoffmann suggests 
that "copyright law protects foxes better than 
hedgehogs".
43
 It is clear that ideas that derived from 
some reasonable aspects of work would be considered 
as an expression for the purposes of the dichotomy.
43
 
Secondly, in terms of determining whether something 
categorized as an idea subjected to expression entitled 
to protection and whether particular copying should 
amount to substantial are depended on the extent to 
which the author's control over his or her work to 
obtain the underlying purposes of copyright.
43
 Lord 
Scott‟s consideration is also based on a similar 
approach that the idea/expression dichotomy is 
confusing because copyright law only gives 
protection for a substantial part of the expression of a 
work.
43
 If the dichotomy aims at separating between 
an idea and its expression, it results in an idea that 
would never be a part of the substantial part that 
derived from that expression.
43
 Therefore, "it is not 
immediately apparent what it means to treat the  




However, Lord Hoffmann's interpretation is not 
able to clarify how to determine whether the 
originality level of a work's feature is adequate to 
overcome the obstacle of the skill, labor, and 
judgment.
43 
It has been contended that “the 
uncertainty that underlies basic copyright principles 
such as originality, fixation and idea/expression 
dichotomy is dangerous to the functioning of the law; 
leaving those principles lose in an identity crisis with 
little meaning at all”.
24
 Thus, the reasons for the 
decision held by the House of Lords in Designers’ 
Guild are unsatisfactory concerning the application of 
the idea/expression dichotomy, and the metaphor of 
the foxes and hedgehogs has inadequate process and 
guidance value. 
In Designer Guild Ltd v Russel William (Textiles), 
the interpretation of the principle would have been 
narrowed by deciding that copyright law refuses to 
protect ideas. In Navataire v Easyjet, the source code 
copyright owner claimed that a former licensee who 
has never seen the source code attempted to emulate 
the functional behavior of the program.
43 
Pumfrey J 
held that there was no copyright infringement, by 




stating that the "functional behavior of a program was 
not similar to the plot of a novel (which might obtain 
protection).
42
 In addition, “that policy weighed against 
protecting the business logic of a program through 
copyright. In Nova Production Ltd v Bell Fruit 
Games, Kiitchin J held that resemblances between 
video games perhaps were caused by general ideas 
lacking skill and effort conducted by the 
programmer.
44
 Regarding this issue, Jacob LJ 
concluded that some aspects inspiring the defendant's 
game are just too commonplace amounting to a 
substantial part of the claimant's game.
42
 In Baigent v 
Random House the claimants Michael Baigent and 
Richard Leigh were two of three authors of a best 
selling book titled “The Holy Blood and The Holy 
Grail (HBHG)”, they alleged that the defendant-Dan 
Brown had infringed the copyright of their work by 
publishing The Da Vinci Code.
45 
The defendant was 
alleged that he had copied the Central Theme of 
HBHG and reproduced a substantial part of HBHG.
46
 
Peter Smith J held that the defendant had used HBHG 
(in the same way as other books) but the facts and 
ideas taken were at such level of abstraction that 
could be considered as copyright infringement.
47
 In 
the judgment, the judge noticed that the line between 
idea and expression is to facilitate a fair balance of the 
conflict between protecting the right of the author and 
allowing literary development.
42 
The decision was 
affirmed on appeal; the Court of Appeal dismissed the 
claimant‟s appeal and agreed with the trial judge. It 
results from the allegation of a substantial part of 
HBHG taken by the defendant was ideas rather than 
„the form or manner in which ideas were expressed‟.
48
 
Mummery LJ stated that the literary copyright does 
not allow the copyright owner to monopolize 
historical research or knowledge and the case that 
describes the defendant's inspiration is obtained from 
the claimant's copyright work but considered as not to 
have taken a substantial part in the World Cup Willie 
case.
48
 The claimant created the World Cup logo from 
1966 comprising a lion in an England strip kicking a 
football, and a modernized version of a lion kicking 
football for England was created by the defendant.
42
 
Despite the fact that the defendant had copied the idea 
of the claimant‟s copyrighted work, the High Court 
concluded that the defendant had only reproduced the 
ideas and not a substantial part of the original. 
 
Conclusion 
In short, it is clear that under the idea/expression 
dichotomy, copyright only protects an artist‟s original 
expression and it does not protect the ideas that are 
being expressed which can be found in one of the 
leading cases in relation to the idea-expression 
dichotomy in artistic works in the UK that is Designer 
Guild Ltd v Russel William (Textiles). However, it 
seems thatthere is uncertainty of the idea and 
expression dichotomy in the UK copyright law  
and different points of view of the Court on the  
issue regarding copyright dispute provided by the 
court resulting in indefinite precedent enabling  
to bind the court to apply the same parameters 
concerning the copyright dispute because of the 
merger doctrine exists in artistic works as decided  
in LB Plastics v Swishand Hanfstaengl v Baines. 
Moreover, what has been suggested by Lord 
Hoffmann that "the more abstract and simple the 
copied idea, the less likely it constitutes a substantial 
part", would become the good approach to the idea-
expression dichotomy issue despite the fact that some 
argue that such approach would be not effective to 
deal with the problem.  
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